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State regulation of religious organizations raises a number of conflicting concerns.  On 
one side, religiously affiliated charitable organizations are subject to the same problems of 
fraud, mismanagement, self-dealing, and discrimination that plague non-religious charities. 
Excluding religiously-affiliated organizations from state purview, therefore, can seriously 
undercut many of the state’s legitimate regulatory concerns.  On the other side, constitutional 
and customary norms of church-separation call for special caution when the state attempts to 
investigate and oversee the activities of religiously-affiliated entities.  Overly aggressive state 
efforts to regulate religious entities can be constitutionally problematic and, even when legally 
permissible, can create a troubling appearance of state abuse of power.   
This paper discusses some of the constitutional and prudential concerns that are raised 
by state regulation of religiously affiliated charitable organizations.  Part I makes a brief 
introductory point.  Any search for clear constitutional standards in this area is likely to be 
frustrating.  Because the principles and policies underlying the constitutional commitment to 
religious freedom are often themselves contradictory, the law in this area is always likely to be 
ambiguous and in flux.  Understanding the constitutional issues then can take us only so far in 
determining how the state should approach its oversight and regulation.  Part II then examines 
some of the prudential concerns that should apply when the state regulates religious 
organizations, focusing particularly on government investigations and prosecutions of religious 
organizations for fraud.  Using United States v. Ballard
1
 as an illustration, the section examines 
why the government needs to be especially sensitive to religious freedom concerns when 
initiating such prosecutions even when its actions are otherwise fully constitutional.  Part III 
then offers some possible guidelines that the states should consider when approaching religious 
fraud cases. 
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
The constitutional principles surrounding state regulation of religious organizations are 
anything but clear.  In part this is because of the incoherent state of religion clause jurisprudence 
generally.  In fact the area is so hopelessly confused that even the United States Supreme Court 
has conceded its own lack of clarity in this area.
2
  The cases frequently conflict, often without 
mutual reference, and there is almost no argument that falls completely out of line with what has 
been previously decided.  As I often tell my students, it is usually quite possible to find a case on 
all fours with virtually any position that one wants to take in the religion clause arena.   
The roots of the doctrinal confusion in this area, moreover, run deep.  Religion Clause 
jurisprudence is uniquely beset by a myriad of internal contradictions and paradoxes.  To begin 
with, the governing provisions themselves are in serious tension.  The Free Exercise Clause 
singles out religion for special protection.  The Establishment Clause, in contrast, singles out 
religion for special disability.  The two clauses thus exert, in the Court’s own words, “conflicting 
pressures,”3 with the result that the competing constitutional commands are not easily reconciled. 
Inevitable conflicts also exist between the basic policies and principles underlying the 
case law.  Consider Everson v. Board of Education,
4
 the Court’s first major Establishment 
Clause case.  Everson addressed the question of whether a state could constitutionally provide 
bus transportation to children attending parochial schools.  In reaching its decision, the Court, 
after reviewing the historical evidence, reached the conclusion that preventing state subsidies of 
religious activity lay at the heart of what the Establishment Clause was designed to achieve.  But 
then, dramatically shifting course, the Court also determined that excluding religious 
organizations from benefits available to all others would suggest a hostility towards religion that 
was also constitutionally problematic.  As such, Everson set the stage for the cases that followed.   
One central religion clause concern would inevitably have to give.
5
 
The intractability of the conflicts underlying the religion clauses run so deep that even the 
term ‘religion’ cannot be defined without raising serious constitutional concerns.  After all, 
providing an official constitutional definition of religion could easily be said to be the ultimate 
Establishment Clause violation.  At the same time, excluding a particular set of beliefs from the 
status of religion could easily be fairly described as the definitive Free Exercise harm.  There is 
no way out.   
The religion clause subtopic regarding state regulation of religious organizations with 
which we are concerned, moreover, may be even more opaque than religion clause jurisprudence 
generally.  To begin with, it brings together a variety of religion clause issues, including such 
matters as corporate religious rights, church autonomy, and church-state entanglement that each 
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present their own sets of ambiguities and contradictions to the table.   Combining them together 
is therefore unlikely to produce easily discernible standards. 
The area is also particularly volatile at the moment because of last year’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran v. EEOC,
6
 addressing the question of whether a religious 
organization enjoyed a constitutionally-based “ministerial” exemption from anti-discrimination 
laws.  To no one’s surprise, the Court ruled that religious organizations held such a right.7  What 
was less predictable about the opinion was its potential implications for future decisions.  Most 
significantly in that respect is the fact that the case may have started the Court down the road to 
overturning or at least seriously limiting Employment Division v. Smith,
8
 the landmark case that 
had previously held that religious organizations were not entitled to exemptions from neutral 
laws under the Free Exercise Clause.  Hosanna-Tabor purported to distinguish Smith by drawing 
a line between state regulation of a religious organization’s internal matters, such as its 
employment of ministers, from state regulation of the religious organization’s external activities 
such as the ceremonial peyote smoking that was at issue in Smith.
9
  As the Court explained: 
a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s 
ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only 
outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns 
government interference with an internal church decision that 
affects the faith and mission of the church itself.
10
 
But it is unclear if this distinction can actually hold up.  Is it really accurate to say that the 
manner in which a religion conducts its ceremonial rituals (the issue in Smith) is “an outward 
physical act”?  Are there types of church decisions that are not “internal” and that do not “affect 
the faith and mission of the church itself,” the criterion for constitutional protection set forth in 
Hosanna-Tabor?  To be sure, Hosanna-Tabor may in the end prove to be little more than a 
minor and fully expected exception to Smith’s general rule.  But because Smith is undoubtedly 
the most important case governing state power to regulate religious organizations, any decision 
that suggests its continued vitality may be in jeopardy places the whole area of law into greater 
uncertainty. 
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Given all this then, the short answer is that anyone seeking to find clear guidelines on the 
law governing state regulation of religious charitable organizations is likely to come away 
seriously disappointed.  There are no clear standards to be had. 
 
II. PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Even if the constitutional rules regarding state regulation of religious organizations were 
clear, however, our inquiry would not be at an end.  The relationship between church and state is 
not governed solely by formal rules of constitutional law.  There are non-legal norms of church-
state separation based on custom, tradition and the perception of the appropriate role of both 
church and state in a democratic, secular society that also play a role in setting the parameters of 
this relationship.  These norms set forth informal constrains as to how church and state should 
inter-react.   
A common example of such norms is the limitation on the involvement of churches in the 
political processes.  Religious organizations have a clear first amendment speech right to directly 
involve themselves in unvarnished, partisan political activity if they so choose.  But there also 
exists a non-constitutional norm that suggests that hyper-partisan political activity by churches is 
inappropriate.  On this basis, many churches will not engage in overtly political activity even 
though they have the right to do so; and, correspondingly, churches that violate this norm will be 
subject to trenchant criticism (and ideally to social or political fallout) for so doing.
11
   
An analogous respect for the norm of church-state separation constrains the state.  Like 
religious organizations, the state needs to be wary about being seen as overreaching its bounds.  
Thus, that states may have the constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute religious 
organizations does not mean that they should do so without restraint any more than religious 
organizations’ speech rights means that those groups should involve themselves in partisan 
political activity without self-restraint.   Rather, church-state norms might suggest, for example, 
that the state needs to be particularly concerned with maintaining both the appearance and reality 
of strict neutrality in how it treats religious organizations and that it must avoid any semblance of 
hostility towards a particular religion or towards a set of religious beliefs.  Further, the concern 
with church-state separation means the state must also be especially respectful of the need for 
religious group autonomy.  The remainder of this section, therefore, examines the need for, and 
the application of, these norms in the context of state prosecution of religious organizations for 
criminal fraud.  
A. Prosecuting Religious Fraud and United States v. Ballard 
Perhaps no case better introduces the genesis of, and the need for, prudential constraints 
on government prosecution of religious organizations than United States v. Ballard.
12
  The 
Ballard litigation grew out of the activities of a religious group known as the “I Am” movement, 
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a group that achieved a substantial numerical following during the 1930’s.13  The leader of the 
group, a former mining engineer named Guy Ballard, claimed among other things that he was 
divinely connected to Saint Germain and that he was a reincarnation of a number of historical 
figures including George Washington, Richard the Lionheart, and Alexander the Great.  Ballard 
also averred, along with his wife Edna and son Donald, that their divine connections vested them 
with certain supernatural powers, including the power to heal the sick.  They further asserted that 
they had actually cured hundreds of persons with serious ailments and diseases.  The Ballards ran 
into trouble with the federal government, however, when they solicited funds through the mail 
based on these representations.
14
  
The government prosecuted Edna and Donald Ballard (Guy having died in the interim) 
for mail fraud and conspiracy.  The two were convicted by a jury and the case eventually wound 
its way to the United States Supreme Court.  The issue before the Court was whether the truth of 
the defendants’ religious beliefs could be considered by the jury as part of its fraud 
determination.  The Court ruled that they could not.  As the Court explained, granting the jury 
(and thereby the state) the authority to evaluate the validity of religious claims would gravely 
threaten religious liberty guarantees.  According to the Court: 
[The First Amendment] embraces the right to maintain theories of 
life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to 
followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our 
Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may 
not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. 
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be 
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond 
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that Guy W. Ballard, now deceased, alias Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre 
Ray King, had been selected and thereby designated by the alleged "ascertained masters," Saint 
Germain, as a divine messenger; and that the words of "ascended masters" and the words of the 
alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mankind through the medium of the 
said Guy W. Ballard. 
 
that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard, by reason of 
their alleged high spiritual attainments and righteous conduct, had been selected as divine 
messengers through which the words of the alleged "ascended masters," including the alleged 
Saint Germain, would be communicated to mankind under the teachings commonly known as the 
"I Am" movement; 
 
that Guy W. Ballard, during his lifetime, and Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard had, by reason 
of supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well 
persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries, or ailments, and did falsely represent to persons 
intended to be defrauded that the three designated persons had the ability and power to cure 
persons of those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which are ordinarily 
classified by the medical profession as being incurable diseases; and did further represent that the 
three designated persons had in fact cured either by the activity of one, either, or all of said 
persons, hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments. 
 
322 U.S. 79-80. 
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the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect 
before the law. Many take their gospel from the New Testament. 
But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a 
jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings 
contained false representations. The miracles of the New 
Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of 
prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could 
be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those 
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom . . . 
. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem 
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those 
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding 
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious 
beliefs of any sect.
15
 
So far as it goes then, the Ballard decision is undoubtedly well-taken.  Religious beliefs, 
almost by definition, may be incredulous and governments, including our own, have at times 
persecuted unpopular religions by attacking the validity of their doctrines.
16
  Allowing the state 
to levy criminal sanctions on the basis of the believability of an adherent’s tenets, therefore, is an 
invitation to abuse.
17
   
Ballard’s conclusion that the state could not inquire into the validity of religious belief, 
however, did not end the federal prosecution.  Rather, the Court held that the government could 
still prove fraud by reference to the Ballards’ sincerity (or lack thereof) in maintaining those 
beliefs.
18
  If it were shown that the Ballards did not believe their own assertions, the fraud 
convictions against them could be sustained.
19
   
B. Justice Jackson’s Ballard Dissent and the Need for Prudential Limitations on State 
Prosecutions 
  The opening left by the Ballard majority allowing the state to maintain the fraud 
convictions triggered a dissent by Justice Jackson.  Although characterizing the Ballards’ 
teachings as “nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth,”20 Jackson would have 
overturned their convictions.  To Jackson, prohibiting the courts from inquiring into the validity 
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of the Ballards’ beliefs was not protection enough.  Inquiring into the defendants’ sincerity was 
equally problematic because it was not feasible to “separate an issue as to what is believed from 
considerations as to what is believable.”21  Submitting the sincerity of the defendants’ beliefs to 
the courts thus raised the same concerns as allowing the courts to measure the validity of the 
defendants’ beliefs because, to Jackson, the two inquiries were essentially inextricable.  
Jackson’s bottom line solution, then, was that religious fraud committed would need to be left 
unpunished on grounds that “[p]rosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into 
religious persecution.”22   
There is much to say on behalf of Jackson’s dissent.  How does one who does not share 
another’s belief determine if that person’s belief is sincere?23  The likely answer is that the closer 
the contested belief is to the fact-finder’s own faith traditions, the more likely it will be that the 
fact-finder will accept the believer’s assertions.  But that is a recipe for protecting those religions 
whose tenets run parallel to majoritarian belief systems.  It is not a formula for protecting diverse 
religious beliefs.  And it is not a formula for protecting against government prosecution of 
unpopular religious beliefs. 
At the same time, there are sound reasons to reject Jackson’s solution of abdicating state 
responsibility to prosecute fraud by religious organizations.  To begin with, the problem of 
religious fraud is not a minor concern.  Fraud in the name of religion is a multi-billion dollar 
criminal enterprise.  One study, for example, (notably by a Christian organization), estimated 
that world-wide fraud by Christian organizations alone amounted to over thirty-four billion 
dollars in 2011, a number exceeding the thirty-one billion dollars that Christian organizations 
devoted to global ministries.
24
   
Fraud in the name of religion, moreover, can be a particularly heinous offense because it 
often exploits individuals when they are at their most vulnerable.  The many individuals who 
donated to the “I Am” movement believing that their ailments and diseases would be cured could 
have spent their funds instead on treatments that might have worked.  Removing religious fraud 
from criminal oversight does not do justice for its victims.
25
 
Further, policing fraudulent actors also serves to promote public confidence in the 
charities that are legitimate.  Leaving religious fraud unpunished not only allows criminals to 
flourish, it may also discourage people from donating to legitimate causes.  Protecting against 
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what they pay for.” 322 U.S. at 94 (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
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charitable fraud, then, no matter what its source, is necessary for protecting the integrity of the 
system. 
Finally, Jackson’s solution does not truly eliminate the sincerity problem because at some 
point the need for the state to inquire into the legitimacy of religious claims is virtually 
unavoidable.  Even if the state were to cease prosecuting religious frauds of the kind at issue in 
Ballard, it would still have to determine whether a claim of religiosity was sincere when brought 
by an individual or organization seeking a benefit for which religious status is a qualification, 
such as a religious property tax exemption or parsonage status for a residential dwelling.  And it 
would also have to determine, at some point, whether the potential target of its investigation is or 
is not religious. 
Nevertheless, although not persuasive in its assertion that the state should forego 
prosecuting religious fraud entirely, Justice Jackson’s Ballard dissent is persuasive in 
demonstrating that even if that state prosecution of purported religious fraud is constitutional, it 
still raises serious issues regarding the relationship of church and state.   As such, it provides 
strong support for the proposition that the state should at least pause before proceeding when it 
targets alleged malfeasance by religious organizations.  The next section, therefore, will attempt 
to build from Justice Jackson’s insights and from the norms of church-state separation noted 
earlier, and offer some specific guidelines as to how the state should proceed in approaching 
possible prosecutions for religious fraud. 
 
III. GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTION 
 
A. Be Absolutely Sure That Any Prosecution is Legitimately Motivated 
First and foremost, the state needs to be absolutely sure that Jackson’s fears are not 
realized and that any prosecution against a religious organization has nothing to do with that 
religion’s unpopularity.   The state, in short, has to be carefully circumspect about its own 
reasons for pursuing a particular religious organization.  Is the reason because that organization’s 
religious assertions seem outrageous to majoritarian sensibilities or is it based on more objective 
indications that the organization’s activities are fraudulent? 
B. Take Extra Care That the Prosecution is Meritorious 
 Even when the government has legitimate grounds for prosecuting a religious 
organization, the difficulty of the sincerity inquiry means the fact-finder may not get it right.  As 
Justice Jackson noted in Ballard, the jury often will not be able to distinguish between what the 
defendant believes and what the jury perceives to be believable.  But if the jury cannot fully 
understand or appreciate the nature of the defendant’s beliefs (as will often happen when the 
religious belief in question comes from outside the jury’s traditional frame of reference), it will 
not now be in a suitable position to determine whether a fraud has actually occurred.  Rather its 
conclusions are more likely to be based on its affinity to the defendant’s beliefs than upon an 
objective appraisal of insincerity.  The state, therefore, has to be especially careful in submitting 
a religious fraud case to the jury because the jury cannot be counted on to be as much of a 




C. Consider the Extent That The Process of Proving a Violation May Itself 
Compromise Church-State Values 
  The state should also take into account whether the process of proving a violation will 
itself compromise church-state values.  In order to prove that a defendant is insincere in her 
beliefs, for example, it must first be determined what those beliefs are.  Inquiring into religious 
belief, however, is perilous on a number of counts.  To begin with, the state is forbidden under 
the first amendment from determining the definition of a religious belief;
26
 so the state will have 
to depend, in large part, on how the belief in question is articulated by the defendant.  But, from 
the perspective of respecting the appropriate bounds between church and state, any attempt by 
the state to inquire into the nature of the religious belief in question or even more problematically 
to attempt to impeach the defendant on this issue is very risky business.  The specter of a state 
prosecutor cross-examining the defendant (or her followers if the defendant does not testify) to 
explain or justify her beliefs is unseemly at best and the state’s probing a religious believer for 
theological inconsistencies in church doctrine in order to impeach is even more troubling.  Few 
religions represent tight exercises in logic and showing discrepancies in doctrine can easily take 
on the appearance of ridicule.
27
  Even attempting to prove that someone is insincere in her beliefs 
by providing examples of that individual deviating from those beliefs in her own personal 
conduct is an uncertain undertaking.  While that strategy can be effective, it may also miss the 
mark.  Is evidence that one has committed adultery proof that one does not believe that adultery 
wrong?  Given the religious liberty concerns at stake, the state should be particularly careful to 
make sure that any conviction is based on actual criminal malfeasance and not upon a person’s 
failure to live up to her principles. 
D. Consider Whether the Purported Victims of the Fraud Are Internal or External 
to the Organization.   
Finally, and perhaps more controversially, the state should also take into account who are 
the victims of the purported fraud and consider being less aggressive in cases where the harm is 
directed at insiders than where the harm directed at outsiders.  I say controversially because there 
are undoubtedly problems with such an approach.  The first is definitional.  Determining who is 
an insider and who is an outsider will not always be easy.
28
  Are regular viewers of a broadcast 
ministry insiders or outsiders?  Are contributors to particular organizations thereby members?  
Nevertheless in cases where the lines are clear, the distinction may make some sense.  Although 
certainly the church member who has contributed to his pastor’s sham building project is as 
much a victim as the person who has contributed to a religious organization’s non-existent 
hunger relief project advertised on television, the church member will likely have some direct 
recourse available.  More importantly for our purposes state intercession into a purely internal 
fraud raises a church-state separation concern in the way state interference into an externally 
directed deception does not.  The line between internal and external may never be fully 
                                                          
26
 See note 23, supra and accompanying text. 
27
 I am aware that ridicule of religion at trial has a vaunted historical pedigree in that it was used by Clarence 
Darrow in his cross examination of Williams Jennings Bryan in the Scopes trial. See EDWARD L. LARSON, SUMMER 
FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997).  
Nevertheless, it is one thing for ridicule to be used by a defendant as a defense to a criminal prosecution and another 
for it to be used by the state to prove criminal charges against a defendant.  
28
  As we saw in our discussion of Hosanna-Tabor, the line between internal and external is never likely to be fully 




satisfactory but, like the other guidelines suggested in this section, it may provide a helpful 




The appropriate role of the state in policing the actions of religious organizations is 
defined by more than just constitutional doctrine and includes non-legal norms of church-state 
intersection that also needs to be taken into account.  Having constitutional authority to regulate 
religious organizations does not necessarily translate into exercising that authority to its fullest 
extent.  The example of state prosecution of religious fraud may provide some helpful insights 
into how and when that authority should be employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
